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Physical telecom networks are costly and few, traditionally to the point of monopoly.  Innovation 
thrives with many independent minds.  So one might hope independent innovators, not only its 
proprietor M, can offer innovative services on a network, as has been true on the Internet.  This 
issue is central in telecom policy; it also arises elsewhere, including complaints about Microsoft.  I 
try to expound the following key points.  Often an unregulated M has ex ante incentives to organize 
service innovation efficiently.  But this incentive breaks down ex post as M can extract an 
independent J￿s quasi-rents (Farrell and Michael Katz 2000).  Even ex ante, the "one monopoly rent 
theorem" (Ward Bowman 1957) fails when M￿s bottleneck access business is more regulated than 
its competitive services (e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole 2000).  This tempts M to 
sabotage J￿s innovations.  "Quarantining" M from the service sector solves these problems, but 
excludes the firm with (often) the best opportunities and the strongest incentives to innovate.  
"Parity pricing" or ECPR (Robert Willig 1979) purports to get the best of both worlds (BoBW).  But it 
seems so hard to implement in innovation markets that one might construe ECPR analysis as 
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 Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network 
Joseph Farrell* 
Physical telecom networks are costly and few, traditionally to the point of 
monopoly.  Innovation thrives with many independent minds.  So one might hope 
independent innovators, not only its proprietor M, can offer innovative services on a 
network, as has been true on the Internet.
1  This issue is central in telecom policy; it also 
arises elsewhere, including complaints about Microsoft. 
If both M and independents innovate in services on M￿s network, then 
independents depend on their (service-level) competitor.  Non-economists often think M 
will always resist independents￿ innovation.  Economists find this too pessimistic: M 
gains as well as loses when an independent innovates.  Some even suggest that a simple 
pricing rule eliminates the problem.  But I think that￿s too optimistic: extreme pessimism 
may not be warranted, but some pessimism is. 
In this terse exposition of these tough issues, I try to expound the following key 
points.  Often an unregulated M has ex ante incentives to organize service innovation 
efficiently.  But this incentive breaks down ex post as M can extract an independent J￿s 
quasi-rents (Farrell and Michael Katz 2000).  Even ex ante, the ￿one monopoly rent 
theorem￿ (Ward Bowman 1957) fails when M￿s bottleneck access business is more 
regulated than its competitive services (e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole 2000).  
This tempts M to sabotage J￿s innovations.  ￿Quarantining￿ M from the service sector 
solves these problems, but excludes the firm with (often) the best opportunities and the 
strongest incentives to innovate.  ￿Parity pricing￿ or ECPR (Robert Willig 1979) purports to get the best of both worlds (BoBW).  But it seems so hard to implement in innovation 
markets that one might construe ECPR analysis as reductio ad absurdum for BoBW. 
I.  A Simple Model
2 
A telecom system is a network, controlled by M, ￿on top of￿ which services are provided 
by M and/or others J.  If he pays M a network subscription fee s, a consumer can buy 
services: for simplicity the model (though not all the discussion) assumes that each 
consumer buys just one service and that all consumers pick the same one.  A consumer￿s 
payoff is v(p,q) ￿ s + t, where ￿quasi-surplus￿ v increases in service quality q and 
decreases in service price p, while t differs across consumers.  Thus subscription demand 
takes the form X(v(p,q) ￿ s), where X is increasing.  The network costs N(X). 
Service providers also pay ￿access charges￿ a per customer to M.  When each 
customer buys one unit of services, v(p, q) takes the separable form u(q) ￿ p, and we have 
redundant prices: (a, p, s) is equivalent to (a+k,  p+k,  s ￿ k). 
Innovation here means improving service ￿quality.￿  I discuss how institutions 
affect innovators￿ quasi-rents (gross of innovation costs) and how those compare to 
social contributions.  Less ambitiously, I often discuss only how incentives with 
integration compare to those without. 
I begin with the analytically simpler case in which M is excluded from the service 
market.  This was (generally) the case with long-distance calling in the US, from the 
AT&T breakup in 1984 until the 1996 Telecommunications Act set conditions for Bell 
companies (M) to enter the long-distance market (as many have now done).  Closer to our 
focus on innovation, a similar ￿quarantine￿ once applied to the ￿enhanced services￿ 
market: see e.g. Farrell and Philip Weiser (2002).  But such quarantines are now rare.  II. No  Integration 
If M￿s prices (a, s) are fixed (perhaps by regulation), independent innovators compete in 
services in ￿the usual way.￿  Because a affects costs and s affects market size, 
independents normally wish both prices were lower, but they are competitively neutral.  
Returns to innovation come, as usual, through e.g. intellectual property (perhaps only a 
license to litigate), first-mover advantage (limited by imitation), attracting customers 
from rival service providers, and bringing new customers into the market.  These 
incentives need not be optimal, but they can be, and they are at least a helpful 
benchmark. 
M is keen to cooperate with service innovation and competition.  If v increases 
slightly by dv, then (holding a and s fixed) X increases by X΄(v-s)dv, so M￿s profits 
(a+s)X ￿ N(X) increase by [a + s ￿ N΄(X)]X΄(v ￿ s)dv.
3  Meanwhile, innovators get a 
￿normal￿ chance at a reward.  (In the simplest model innovators make profits equal to 
their social contribution.) 
If s maximized M￿s profits, then X = [a + s ￿ N￿(X)] X΄(v ￿ s), so M internalizes 
the full increase in quasi-surplus (even though, since s is fixed, consumers also get that 
increase!).  If v increases discretely by ∆v, then at fixed s, M may gain less than X∆v even 
if s was profit-maximizing.  But if M can change s in response to ∆v, it captures at least 
X∆v: by increasing s by ∆v, it maintains X and increases its margin by ∆v; if this is not 
M￿s best response then it can gain even more. 
When M fully internalizes changes in quasi-surplus, its long-run interests are 
probably close to efficient.  Yet in the short run it might be tempted to confiscate 
innovators￿ quasi-rents.  Farrell and Katz (2000) discuss ways it can do so.  For instance, if demand X is L-shaped, then by raising s (or a) M can force an innovator to cut its 
markup to zero.  For more general demand, however, this will not work. 
These observations imply that an unintegrated M is even willing to bear substantial 
costs to help downstream innovation that increases v.
4  They also quantify the vertical 
feed-through that spawns both the Jekyll and the Hyde of integration by M. 
III. Integration 
If only one firm offered services, integration between it and M would have obvious 
benefits.  It would eliminate double-marginalization pricing; for the same reason, 
internalizing the vertical feed-through would make it keener to innovate.  
Independents often complain about integration by M.  They might whine simply 
because M is keener to innovate than they are, or than the independent it perhaps 
replaces.  More legitimate complaints arise if M￿s integration saps independents￿ 
incentives to innovate.  As I discuss below, M may sabotage independents; it may extract 
their ex post quasi-rents; and it may have an ￿unfair￿ advantage because (perhaps) it 
doesn￿t pay above-cost access charges.  
A.  Sabotage 
By nastily manipulating the network-service interface (if allowed), or by stubbornly 
declining to do so, M may be able to sabotage independents￿ innovation.  So we want M 
to want to cooperate. 
As we saw above, an unintegrated M wants to cooperate.  Perhaps surprisingly, so 
does (often) an unregulated integrated M.  Since such an M fully captures any increase in 
quasi-surplus, its goal in the services market is to maximize Π
M
service + Xv = Wservice ￿ Π
J.   
Thus M will like innovation by an independent J unless the innovation increases independents￿ joint profits by more than it boosts total surplus: probably an unusual case.  
This is a version of Bowman￿s (1957) one monopoly rent theorem.
5 
Will a regulated integrated M cooperate or sabotage?  If independent J innovates 
then (at fixed prices) M gains (i) a on the business diverted from its own services to J￿s, 
and (ii) a + s ￿ N￿(X) on any new subscribers (who presumably buy from J).  It loses its 
margin on its lost service business.  High access charges thus encourage M to cooperate; 
but they also (given M￿s service prices) discourage an independent from innovating in 
order to take customers from M. 
B.  Pushing Independents￿ Ex Post Quasi-Rents Upstream 
When M internalizes consumer quasi-surplus benefits in the service market, it will be a 
very aggressive competitor in that market.
6  While this behavior is highly desirable in 
some ways, it can confiscate independents￿ quasi-rents.  This is much like the difference 
between a desirably strong competitor who simply offers good deals, and a strong reactor 
who offers good deals only when a rival does so.   
1. Pricing 
M may push its own rents upstream (from services to subscription); it often can also push 
independents￿ rents upstream and thereby confiscate them. 
Because M captures upstream any increases in quasi-surplus v, Farrell and Katz 
(2000) show that M gains by pricing a successful service at production cost and taking all 
its rents upstream.
7  By contrast, independents price successful innovations well above 
cost.  Thus a successful M prices lower than a similarly situated independent.   
In the simplest models this does not affect independents￿ incentives to innovate, 
because the difference arises only when M leads in quality.  But in general M￿s low price may force successful independents to cut theirs; that raises quasi-surplus, and hence M￿s 
profits.  An integrated M can thus confiscate innovators￿ ex post quasi-rents; Farrell and 
Katz (2000) argue that this confiscation technique may well work better than 
manipulating (a, s) or threatening to withdraw cooperation, techniques available to M 
whether integrated or not. 
2.  Catch-Up Innovation, Imitation, Litigation 
When product-market competition is fierce enough, an independent will perceive little 
private gain from catch-up innovation, imperfectly inventing around another firm￿s 
patents, or imitation.  Thus a firm that makes a technological advance will keep its lead 
until it can profitably be leapfrogged.  
An integrated M, however, gains (upstream) from the pecuniary effect (Farrell 
and Katz 2000) of a catch-up innovation that makes a leader lower its price; or from 
imperfectly imitating.  Similarly, because M captures increases in quasi-surplus, it will 
leapfrog a successful independent faster than would another independent.  Finally, M 
may profitably challenge an independent￿s patent, even where another independent 
would not.
8 
In short, its upstream interests make M a more aggressive service-market 
competitor than an independent: in its own willingness to innovate, but also in its 
propensity to imitate, invent around, litigate against, and cut prices against, a successful 
independent innovator.  So first-mover advantage, differentiation, and intellectual 
property reward independent innovators less when M is integrated. 
C.  Above-Cost Access Charges and Level Playing Fields Non-economists often worry that M pays only N￿(X) for access, while independents pay 
a.  Economists note that if M lures customers from independents by offering better 
services, then it gives up a in access charges on each such customer, so its opportunity 
cost is a (and since that customer subscribes anyway, N￿(X) and s are irrelevant).  But, to 
the extent that an innovation attracts new customers onto the network, an independent 
pays a per new customer (besides service costs and revenues) while M pays N￿(X) ￿ s.
9 
Thus, in mature networks or for modest innovations (X  won￿t change much), M 
effectively pays roughly a in access charges: a ￿level playing field.￿
10  But when a big 
innovation will significantly boost X, and a + s >> N￿(X), it follows that M has more 
incentive to innovate than independents.  It is less clear at this level whether, given a, 
M￿s integration inefficiently saps independents￿ incentives or merely introduces one 
player with better incentives.  
IV.  Efficient Component Pricing 
Economists have asked whether access charges can yield the best of both worlds 
(BoBW): M can integrate and yet preserve its incentive to cooperate and independents￿ 
efficient incentives to innovate.  In their usual formulation, ECPR access charges (Willig 
1979; Laffont and Tirole 2000) are calculated, starting from fixed (presumably regulated) 
service prices for M, so as to compensate M for lost business when an independent 
attracts customers away.  In the simplest models, an independent can (barely) compensate 
M, (barely) attract consumers, and become residual claimant of its innovation￿s 
contribution to total surplus.  ECPR access pricing thus rewards productively efficient 
entry or independent innovation, and also (at least weakly) makes M willing to 
cooperate.
11 Might ECPR be the key to BoBW?  Others have criticized ECPR on various 
grounds;
12 here I argue that it is exceptionally hard to implement in an innovation market. 
For instance, why is ECPR a rule, rather than just a Coase-theorem prediction 
that efficient innovations will be adopted and M compensated?  Flexible access charges 
might help M confiscate quasi-rents, but a more standard concern is that without the rule 
M might refuse to subcontract to a more efficient J, presumably because of effects on 
competition: e.g., J might (Netscape-Oedipally) turn on M and support a rival network.  
So one must exclude the effects of future increases in competition in M￿s ￿lost profits￿ 
for ECPR.  But now we lose ECPR￿s nicest property: M will after all want to sabotage J. 
Meanwhile, telecommunications firms value customer relationships; this value 
should count in M￿s lost profits when a rival takes the customer.  (Otherwise, M again 
wants to sabotage, and inefficient rivals will try to take the customer.)  ECPR must thus 
include one large, intangible, unverifiable number, while rigorously excluding another. 
Or suppose that J innovates, and later, at time T, M introduces a similar service, 
claiming that it had been in the works already.  How should access charges account for 
substitution between these services?  If M really would have introduced its service at T 
anyway, then ECPR says that after T, J should compensate M (sic) for the business that J 
retains after M￿s imitation!  Otherwise M would want to sabotage J, and J would have 
excess incentives to pre-empt M￿s impending innovation.  Yet J will hardly innovate if 
the rule lets M claim much of the quasi-rents from J￿s innovation by imitating it and 
saying ￿We were going to do that.￿ 
Where these effects loom large, regulators can￿t even approximate the ECPR that 
has the nice properties.  If a exceeds ECPR, it deters efficient (even productively efficient) entry and innovation.  If a is below ECPR, M wants to sabotage.  Because some 
of M￿s concerns don￿t count for ECPR, and because it￿s hard to attract consumers 
without ￿over￿-compensating them, one could easily make both errors simultaneously. 
Thus ECPR does not neatly resolve the thorny problem of whether and how to let M 
integrate into services innovation.  ECPR is one necessary (not sufficient) condition for 
BoBW, and one that almost surely fails even if policy focuses on meeting it; so BoBW is 
a pipe dream.  The nicest solution would be real competition among more than a couple 
of networks.  If that is not forthcoming (networks are costly), the issues sketched here 
present very hard problems for policy, and for business practice. 
V.  Can We Learn From Unregulated Cases? 
Regulators can sometimes learn from how unregulated firms manage analogies to the 
regulatory problem.  Unregulated firms often try to avoid ￿competing with customers,￿ 
but not always.  Microsoft produces both the dominant PC operating system and also 
applications software that competes against independents￿ applications.  It neither prices 
applications at cost nor charges access fees to complementors (as ECPR would 
presumably prescribe).  Independent innovation continues, though some claim it is 
sapped by Microsoft￿s presence.  Similarly, Annabelle Gawer and Rebecca Henderson 
(2003) study Intel￿s relationship with complementor/competitors.  Managers they 
interviewed ￿talked continually about the need to reassure third parties that Intel was not 
going to compete ‘too aggressively￿ in the market for complements.￿References 
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1 Many minds could work for M, but might not be independent. 
2 This model is from Farrell and Katz (2000), which treats rent extraction and sabotage in 
more depth than here, but does not discuss ECPR or (mostly) access charges. 
3 Even if (a, s) is regulated so that (a + s)X = N(X), M gains if network provision involves 
economies of scale, so that N￿(X) < N(x)/X. 
4 In Farrell and Katz￿ (2000) undifferentiated Bertrand model, only drastic or catch-up 
innovation increases v; realistically, almost any real innovation does so. 
5 Farrell and Weiser (2002) describe exceptions to this ￿theorem,￿ or ￿internalization of 
complementary efficiencies￿ (ICE) principle. 
6 M￿s interest in quasi-surplus as well as service-level profits might make it behave like a 
government agency that needn￿t turn a profit.  I suspect that those who worry about 
government competing against private enterprise mostly don￿t worry about vertical 
integration by private monopolists, and vice versa. 
7 ECPR (see below) essentially models M as doing this, by imputing a value of a that 
would only then explain its pricing. 
8 M could also demand a license in return for access to the network.  Then M can imitate, 
seemingly dissipating innovation rents but in fact shifting them upstream.   There are 
similar strategies without integration.                                                                                                                                                  
9 Not N￿(X), because here it is new customers rather than (say) ￿new minutes￿ for 
existing customers in long-distance.  If M￿s network budget is balanced, so a + s = 
N(X)/X, then N￿(X) ￿ s = a ￿ [N(X)/X ￿ N￿(X)], so the effective discount on access 
charges is the degree of economies of scale in network costs.  If M makes a network 
profit then the discount is greater. 
10 This assumes M understands the opportunity-cost argument (even many economists 
don￿t).  If not, or if M economically doesn￿t pay a, I doubt that rules can make M act as if 
it did.  Regulators sometimes ask M to show, by accounting, that a service could be 
profitable if it did pay a.  Such ￿imputation￿ seems especially inapt when service is 
innovation-intensive, so that many services will fail and the ￿hits￿ can generate big 
profits (but even they may require penetration pricing). 
11 Standard ECPR overcompensates M through profits from increased subscriptions ￿ 
though this effect vanishes if consumers get no additional quasi-surplus. 
12 Nicholas Economides and Lawrence White (1995) stress that productively inefficient 
entry can be economically efficient. 